Anyone who pays attention to the criminal justice systems in America and in other Western democracies knows that the U.S. as a whole is more punitive in its responses to lawbreaking than any similar society. Professor Whitman's wonderful book addresses the question of why this is so. The book's answers, rooted in centuries of history and rich comparative analysis, are surprising, provocative, and persuasive. I know I'll be considering and reconsidering Whitman's major arguments for a long time to come.

"Harsh Justice is original, imaginative, and erudite. The mastery of
sources in many languages is awe-inspiring, and Whitman's argument resounds with daring suggestions and bold insights. A genuinely learned book, nothing short of brilliant."
--Lawrence Friedman, author of Law in America

"In this book James Whitman asks and answers questions in realms where others fear to tread. He confronts the brutal fact that we punish more harshly in the United States than do Europeans and forces us to think about the questions of social structure that lie behind this practice. He develops a thesis about the current impact of Nazi jurisprudence that is sure to trigger arguments from more conventional thinkers. This is a profound book, impeccably researched and documented, one that will change the way we think about criminal punishment and increase our appreciation of comparative legal studies."
--George Fletcher, author of The Secret Constitution

"Original, insightful, and provocative, Harsh Justice will start a conversation that has been importantly absent from modern criminology and criminal law. James Whitman asks fundamental questions about the cultural roots of modern differences in penal policy in developed nations and breaks new ground in addressing these issues."
--Franklin E. Zimring, William G. Simon Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley

The History of Germany by Eleanor Turk is a well-organized, comprehensive, and academic narrative of German history; yet it is highly readable. The book is written in a way that creates academic interest and provides answers to questions that college and high school students, as well as general readers, have had about Germany's past and have wanted clarified.

Beginning with a timeline and chronologically tracing distinct events, the author first focuses on modern Germany in order to establish in the reader's mind a full understanding of Germany's status--its problems and successes--today. Readers are then taken back to antiquity and the middle ages while being given the opportunity to examine each subsequent period of German history with its unique problems and to visualize how various crises within each period impacted Germany's future. Especially helpful is a chapter centering on notable people who have played important roles in the history of Germany.

Dr. Turk has the unique ability of making the pieces of the puzzle fall into place until the present reality of Germany and its future potential come into view. As one college student observed, "This is not a stuffy textbook. It reads like a novel."

Turk's book is an outstanding single volume history of Germany from prehistory to 1998. It covers the Immigration Period, the Middle Ages, Early Modern, the 19th Century, the World Wars, and the Reunification of East and West Germany in 1990. Turk gives an appropriate amount of detail, and provides the novice with an outstanding first look at the history of one of the world's most important countries.

Ian Kershaw is the premier historian on Hitler and Nazi Germany and this book from the Profiles in Power series is an excellent study on the roots, success, and ultimate destruction of the "Fuehrercult." Two schools of thought are used by historians to understand the power of Nazism. "Intentionalists" see the Nazi regime as the embodiment of Hitler as the totalitarian leader. "Structuralists," however, believe the policies and, ultimately, the crimes of Nazi Germany were stumbled upon by underlings working under a loose framework rather than a deliberate program. As one would expect, Kershaw takes from both these theories to develop his comprehensive profile.

Kershaw examines Hitler's worldview of racial struggle, anti-Semitism, and living space for the German empire--how these ideas developed (Hitler's background) and how Hitler used them to create his leadership image. This Fuehrercult unified a fractional party, helped repress opposition, and created a mass following. Through Hitler's charismatic leadership the German people would be prepared to fight the Nazi fight (inevitably WWII). Kershaw also looks at the feudal-like power relations inside the Third Reich; a regime of open-ended decrees that left no "smoking gun" pointing at Hitler for the Final Solution. Finally, Kershaw examines the destruction of Hitler's power during which the irrational optimism that "Providence" (i.e. Hitler's will) would prevail was still believed by many (particularly the 'court' of Hitler's bunker). I recommend this book especially to advanced history students who want an in-depth examination of Hitler's power in a compact 230-page book. The book includes footnotes, an index, a chapter on further readings, and a chronology of events.

It is not your typical biography of Hitler. It is a thorough examination and analysis of Hitler's rise to power. It examines how he got power, how he maintained power, how he used power, and, finally, how he lost power. Quite an interesting book. Be sure to check out other books in this "Profiles in Power" series.

This books offers great information on the actions and events which all of Hitler's battleships were involved in. From the beggining to the end of Hitler's battleships, this book gives you detailed information on each of the battleships and all of their sorties carried out during world war II. My only complaint is the lack of pictures, illustrations, maps, and graphs. But besides that, the book is very good and contains great information.

This book was a huge surprise for me. It covers the strenghts of the battleships, their most known operations and even their place in the structure of the Kriegsmarine.For the Navy Fans its a book that you cannot miss and for the others it's also a good and interesting book.Buy it!

I may not be the best person to review this book because it is too sophisticated for even me, a student in economics. It is more of a book for someone who already knows something about the economy of that period and would like to go in more depth. However, I still managed to learn from this book a good deal. The author focuses on the main Nazi work creation programs like motorization, Autobahn, emergency relief, and rearmament. He stresses on the fact that most work creation from the period 1933-1936 was not a result of rearmament rather a fierce attack on employment through some of the methods mentioned above. In addition, the growing control of the Nazi party over all aspects of the economy is clearly identified in every chapter as this control grows. The book is loaded with information and probably is a great book for research. The book is well and professionally written and is worth the money; especially that it is one of the few books on this subject. However, if you are looking for something far more basic The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-1938, is very good.

According to conventional wisdom, as a result of military expenditures, Hitler's economy went from 34%unemployment when he entered office in early 1933 to virtually full employmenr by 1936. Professor Silverman argues, as a result of impressive research in Nazi archives, that it was work creation programs that account for this "miracle" and it was the 4-year Plan announced in 1936 that represented an emphasis on autarky and arms and a seller's market.It is surprising how conservative Hitler's initial plans were since they relied on the expertise of Hjalmar Schacht, who was replaced by Walther Funk after the announcement of the 4-year plan.by Goebbles. The early years represented continuity with the Bruning policy, particularly the Todt plans for motorization and the famous autobahns, one of the positive legacies of Hitler. Silverman's account of sharp regional differences is also interesting with East Prussia getting back to full employment at an early dater and Aachen lagging. It is natural to compare Hitler's achievements with FDR's New Deal which initially had to deal with only 25% unemployment. Generally speaking, Hitler was the more successful, particularly in view of FDR's attempt to balance the budget in 1937 thereby producing the Roosevelt recession and the rise of unemployment from 14% to 19%. While Currie and Eccles managed to achieve the Keynesian euthanasia of the rentier in the late thirties, Roosevelt was overall a timid Keynesian until Wprld War II and was plagued by double-digit unemployment until 1941.FDR devalued the dollar in 1933 by about the same percentage as Britain in 1931 but Hitler and Schachr ruled out currency devaluation because of fears that it would be inflationary. Policies under Bruning had been brutally deflationary with workers taking a 10% wage cut, but thr 1923 hyperinflation (and Schacht's role in stopping it) was still fresh in policy-makers' minds. Workers in voluntary labor camps which absorbed unemployment were paid very low wages and lost their unemployment compensation which helped maintain price stability. Strangely Silverman hardly mention the USSR as a source of ideas in the Hitler years lthough the 4-year Plan itself was inspired by the Soviet FYP, the second of which was being completed by the time Goebbels began administering the German equivalent. Earlier (February,1935) Soviet-type "work books" necessary for employment were introduced. Ther Russian economy today would seem to have more to learn from the German experience after 7 years of Yeltsin's brutally deflationary monetarist policy than from FRD's fiscal bungling. The non-payment of wage and pension arrears is a historic low in the application of the neo-classical notion that attrbutes recessionary unemployment to exhorbitant wages.

Mitcham's account covers all the German FMs in great detail, including their characters and military abilities. The writing is fresh and clear, absorbing and never boring. The battle accounts are insightful. One of the best WWII books I've read.

Although Mitcham's book covers the careers of twenty or more field marshals he nevertheless manages to draw pictures of them all. Each field marshal is covered in pinpoint detail. What I find most interesting about this piece of work is that by presenting one short biography after the other Mitcham shows the relevance of one field marshal to the other. In other words, Mr Mitcham draws lines which connect all these field marshals together and helps us understand all the combined military acheivements and also all the intrigues and jealousies which prevailed amongst these top military commanders of the Third Reich. Mr Mitcham leaves no one out either, instead of presenting field marshals only known to the western world , Mr Mitcham also gives valuable insight into obscure field marshals like generalfeldmarshal Georg Kluecher. In my opinion , this book is quite valuable to historians who wish to study top German military commanders of the Second World War.

Rupert Butler has done a great favour to all those interested in Balkan history but for whom the skein of Balkan history appears at times much too tangled to unravel and certainly much too difficult to tackle in the single slender volume.

Butler's choice of organisation on a chronological and country by county basis follows the gradual growth of the Hitler Jackal Pack in Italy and Central Europe (Vichy France is excluded). This is straightforward enough but he also manages to consistently interweave select reoccuring themes. One of these is the way the general populous regarded Naziism and their country's growing relations with a party formed on racialist lines. It is clear that although there were large parts of the population that supported and aped Naziism in an attempt to ingratiate and carry out their own Nazi revolutions, there were also genuine patriots on the left and right with little time for the foolish pedantry of Nazi racial ideologues.

National parties in Romania and Hungary were at least partially successful in breaking the full force of Nazi attempts to penetrate all aspects of society: King Boris managed to keep Bulgarian troops out of Russia; Admiral Horty managed until 1944 to keep Hungary free from occupation by Germany and, both countries managed to hold off intially the full impact of the main ideological assualt from Naziism against the Jews. In many cases nationalism was the bulkwark against both Naziism and Communism with national parties consolidating power in the early stages of the war at the expense of home grown Nazi parties. In Rumania the forces of the right were actually able to purge and lock up Rumanian Nazis and institute a nationalist/ fascist regime while at the same time currying favour with Hitler.

Hitler's role was at first pragmatic. By using pressure tactics he was able to make a deal with nationalist parties in the Balkans in his persuit for their ultimate paticipation in his War against Russia and, at least tacit compliance in rounding up Jews.

But national parties, with the exception of Bulgaria, at the end of the day were still not able to avoid Hitler's demands of participation in the War against the Allies and specifically sending units to the Russian front. In addition, the progressive elimination of the Jews, so central to Hitler's foreign policy, could not be inevitably put off with scions like Heydrich, Himmler, Frank and Eichmann roaming the Balkans. When nations lost their nerve in the war they were directly occupied by Germany, as Hungary was in 1944, and national nazi-like parties given the riegns of power by their German masters. This allowed the latent Nazi killing machine to directly kick into gear and brought national anti-semites to butcher and kill with impugnity.

In all of the countries with the exception of Croatia (perhaps Hitler's most rabid jackal) the real terror and wholesale killing of political opponents and Jews began after the demise of national parties, such as when King Boris of Bulgaria died and when Admiral Horthy of Hungary was placed under arrest and power given to the Arrow Cross (Hungarian Nazis of a particularly brutal ilk).

Butler also traces the role of these countries as allies of Germany in WWII. Despite stereotypes the soldiers of almost all of the countries, particularly Rumania, fought well in Russia, moreover they produced their fair share of outstanding pilots. Their main downfall was lack of proper equipment and clothing for campaigning in Russia. Each country had no ideological axe to grind with Moscow but all profited in the early Nazi victories by adding significant slices of territory to their national boundaries.

The participation of all countries comes alive in this book and there is plenty to keep one interested. We see individual nations with their own domestic problems and achievements factored into their WWII role. Butler does not mash all countries together to yeild a grand theory. Continuums in fervour for the Nazi cause existed and come out in this book. On one side was the incredibly sadistic rule of Ante Pavelic in Croatia (it would be hard to find a more willing Nazi nation), to the national governments of Horthy (Hungary) and Antonescu (Rumania) struggling to maintain power along national popular fascist lines, while all the time keeping at arms length (and at times suppressing national Nazi movements); to King Boris of Bulgaria covetous of Northern Greece and parts Rumania yet determined to avoid war with Russia.

Despite the occassional stands of national resistence movements in the Jackal nations there is not too much to be proud of here for the respective countries. Although Hitler threatened and inveigled, there we far too many willing adherents to Nazi ideologies in these countries and they showed this in their willingness to profit on the territorial gains given initially by German victory and their zeal to exterminate Jews. Admiral Horthy has recently been ressurected in Hungary as a hero in the struggle against Germany, but it is clear from Butler's book that no amount of national re-examination or attempt to look for heroes in these times can erase the guilt and collective shame for the actions of the "Jackal Pack' in this desperate period.

Rupert Butler has done a great favour to all those interested in Balkan history but for whom the skein of Balkan history appears at times much too tangled to unravel and certainly much too difficult to tackle in the single slender volume.

Butler's choice of organisation on a chronological and country by county basis follows the gradual growth of the Hitler Jackal Pack in Italy and Central Europe (Vichy France is excluded). This is straightforward enough but he also manages to consistently interweave select reoccuring themes. One of these is the way the general populous regarded Naziism and their country's growing relations with a party formed on racialist lines. It is clear that although there were large parts of the population that supported and aped Naziism in an attempt to ingratiate and carry out their own Nazi revolutions, there were also genuine patriots on the left and right with little time for the foolish pedantry of Nazi racial ideologues.

National parties in Romania and Hungary were at least partially successful in breaking the full force of Nazi attempts to penetrate all aspects of society: King Boris managed to keep Bulgarian troops out of Russia; Admiral Horty managed until 1944 to keep Hungary free from occupation by Germany and, both countries managed to hold off intially the full impact of the main ideological assualt from Naziism against the Jews. In many cases nationalism was the bulkwark against both Naziism and Communism with national parties consolidating power in the early stages of the war at the expense of home grown Nazi parties. In Rumania the forces of the right were actually able to purge and lock up Rumanian Nazis and institute a nationalist/ fascist regime while at the same time currying favour with Hitler.

Hitler's role was at first pragmatic. By using pressure tactics he was able to make a deal with nationalist parties in the Balkans in his persuit for their ultimate paticipation in his War against Russia and, at least tacit compliance in rounding up Jews.

But national parties, with the exception of Bulgaria, at the end of the day were still not able to avoid Hitler's demands of participation in the War against the Allies and specifically sending units to the Russian front. In addition, the progressive elimination of the Jews, so central to Hitler's foreign policy, could not be inevitably put off with scions like Heydrich, Himmler, Frank and Eichmann roaming the Balkans. When nations lost their nerve in the war they were directly occupied by Germany, as Hungary was in 1944, and national nazi-like parties given the riegns of power by their German masters. This allowed the latent Nazi killing machine to directly kick into gear and brought national anti-semites to butcher and kill with impugnity.

In all of the countries with the exception of Croatia (perhaps Hitler's most rabid jackal) the real terror and wholesale killing of political opponents and Jews began after the demise of national parties, such as when King Boris of Bulgaria died and when Admiral Horthy of Hungary was placed under arrest and power given to the Arrow Cross (Hungarian Nazis of a particularly brutal ilk).

Butler also traces the role of these countries as allies of Germany in WWII. Despite stereotypes the soldiers of almost all of the countries, particularly Rumania, fought well in Russia, moreover they produced their fair share of outstanding pilots. Their main downfall was lack of proper equipment and clothing for campaigning in Russia. Each country had no ideological axe to grind with Moscow but all profited in the early Nazi victories by adding significant slices of territory to their national boundaries.

The participation of all countries comes alive in this book and there is plenty to keep one interested. We see individual nations with their own domestic problems and achievements factored into their WWII role. Butler does not mash all countries together to yeild a grand theory. Continuums in fervour for the Nazi cause existed and come out in this book. On one side was the incredibly sadistic rule of Ante Pavelic in Croatia (it would be hard to find a more willing Nazi nation), to the national governments of Horthy (Hungary) and Antonescu (Rumania) struggling to maintain power along national popular fascist lines, while all the time keeping at arms length (and at times suppressing national Nazi movements); to King Boris of Bulgaria covetous of Northern Greece and parts Rumania yet determined to avoid war with Russia.

Despite the occassional stands of national resistence movements in the Jackal nations there is not too much to be proud of here for the respective countries. Although Hitler threatened and inveigled, there we far too many willing adherents to Nazi ideologies in these countries and they showed this in their willingness to profit on the territorial gains given initially by German victory and their zeal to exterminate Jews. Admiral Horthy has recently been ressurected in Hungary as a hero in the struggle against Germany, but it is clear from Butler's book that no amount of national re-examination or attempt to look for heroes in these times can erase the guilt and collective shame for the actions of the "Jackal Pack' in this desperate period.

de una epopeya, en la que los heroicos guerreros españoles le devolvieron a Stalin la visita que este habia hecho a su pais, mediante sus comisarios, durante la guerra civil, es una edicion que actualmente se encuentra agotada, yo poseo un ejemplar comprado hace ya 16 años en la libreria San Martin, de Madrid, el cual fue el primero y muy valioso de una serie de estudios historicos que poseo acerca del desempeño de la legendaria division azul en tierras rusas,mi ejemplar no lo venderia por nada del mundo.

A great book for everyone. It is one of the few books that would satisfy both the serious historians with the detailed accounts and the casual readers with the plethora of human drama. It describes the journey and battles of the Spanish Blue Division, made of volunteers from Spain to fight Soviet Russia. By recounting the events in one sector on the Leningrad front, the book gives the readers a feeling of the enormity of the Eastern Front. A must-read for anyone interested in World War II history.

This book gives us a look at how Hitler viewed the world. This book is written with great skill. Here it is shown that Hitler had a self-consistent Weltanschauung. It is an analysis of Hitler's own writtings; both versions of "Mein Kampf" and his "Secret Book". See why he did what he did. The reason for his domestic and foreign policy. The truth that Hitler was neither a nationalist nor a socialist but a racist. And his thoughts on the Jews. And how he convinced himself that only through expansion, racial purity and the destruction of the Jewish people could any Nation/Race survive and prosper.

Hitler's Mein Kampf is one of the most boring books I have read. Even knowing what happened, I found myself thinking: "He must be thinking metaphorically; he really can't mean this." Jaeckel succeeded in making Hitler comprehensible, weird, but compresensible. He in particular clarifies the fact that Hitler was neither a nationalist nor a socialist but a racist. That's why he ordered the destruction of Germany. For him, the Germans were not fit to survive his death. The author also points to the ambiguities in Hitler's attitudes towards the Jews. If the Jews were so inferior, why were they a threat to the "Aryans." Hitler thought of the Jews as subhuman but also as the anti-race, somewhat like matter::anti-matter. Anyone who is interested in the most powerful, the most significant and the most enigmatic of leaders from the 16 th to the 21st centuries should read this book.

The author of "Hitler Black Magician" makes it clear that he is intimately familiar with the practices of magick as a spiritual discipline. As such, he has demonstrated his ability to guide the reader through the advantages and pitfalls that magicians encounter in their quest for personal development.
Hitler seems to have had no spiritual impulse that would satisfy ordinary definitions of spirituality, but substituted the spiritual drive with a drive for power. That is what distinguishes a spiritually motivated mystic from a "black" magician according to Suster's use of the term.
As Suster uses the term, "occult" is not a synonym for "evil". It is a commonly used word in metallurgy, geology, engineering, medicine, astronomy, etc. Jesus himself spoke of his own "Mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven", which were hidden to the unitiated, and thus "occult" in the philosophic/theological sense. In the psychological sense, occultism is the use of natural structures of the psyche to access the Unconscious, releasing otherwise hidden resources for conscious use. Almost all religions utilize occult practices to accomplish this, especially pneumatic groups such as Christian Pentecostals. The minimum result is conversion. The maximum result is highly advanced mysticism.
Those who study these disciplines are familiar with the traps to which Hitler ultimately fell prey. As a former Pentecostal minister, I can attest to the fact that many ministers fall prey to the very same traps that Hitler failed to survive, and that Suster has identified those traps succinctly. It requires a practitioner of occult spiritual traditions to accomplish this. As Suster points out, traditional historians are rarely equipped to explore this aspect of Hitler's life and person.
Suster has also done well in introducing Aleister Crowley into the discussion. He shows that Crowley, far from being a minor player in our century, had tapped into an intuitive understanding of what the two world wars meant in terms of evolving changes in human history. He foresaw the crumbling of the social and economic structures with which Christianity had entangled itself, and predicted the ultimate demise of this religion as the dominant tool of the Establishment of pre-1888 Europe. He also shows that Hitler had also tapped into this intuitive understanding, whether or not he had ever heard of Crowley. Hitler rightly saw himself as the instrument of this destruction of old institutions.
Suster identifies American Christian Fundamentalism as a current form of fascism, and warns the reader to be wary of their tactics. This last point is mentioned only briefly at the end, but in practical terms, it is a thought-provoking conclusion to this very well-written exploration of The Man Who Destroyed Old Europe.

The author presents a convincing case for Hitler being a black magician. This is a better book than the occult reich, by brennan. In this book, Suster shows the numerous links Hitler had with the occult, most notably with black magick. He shows how Hitler used various esoteric techniques to create a magnetic personality and influence the mind of the mob. This book presents some incredible claims, but whoever said that truth is stranger than fiction, knew what he was talking about. Although the occult has a sinister reputation, due more to ignorance than anything else, it shows what power lies in certain facets of its practice. Hitler proves this for all time.