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Debunking the myth of Versailles

SublimeSelections from Friedrich's letters are a neat fit, bowing to the idea that his transcendental painting ultimately eludes scholarly discourse.
This book lands with authority, passion, and a keen sense of the vistas of silence that Friedrich communicates to admirers everywhere.
A bargain. Snap it up if you come across it...


Provides an in-depth understanding of the artist & his work

Great Multi-Perspective View

The Only RAF Large-Scale Precision Night AttackBomber Command had never attempted a large-scale precision night attack before and indeed, this was the only occasion it was tried. Three other innovations were employed: time & distance runs, a master bomber and moving aim points. However Middlebrook makes the point that the American 8th Air Force, which was trained for daylight precision attacks, was not consulted because Churchill wanted Peenemünde to be an "all-British" operation. If true, this was a stupid case of national pride overriding operational common sense. On the bright side, the British mounted a highly successful Mosquito diversion over Berlin which drew off most of the 200 German night fighters launched and there was no fighter opposition for the first half of the raid. British intruding night fighters also had a good night and shot down four Luftwaffe fighters, including two aces. The Germans badly misjudged where the raid was going, partly since the Luftwaffe low-level commanders did not know the significance of Peenemünde. The raid did inflict significant damage on the housing area but it failed to hurt either the experimental works or V-2 production buildings. About 150 Germans (incl. 2 scientists) and 600 foreign laborers were killed. The RAF lost 41 aircraft and 290 men, almost all on the exit route when the night fighters finally showed up. The moonlight night made it something of a duck shoot.
Middlebrook believes that the raid cost the Germans about 6-8 weeks worth of delay in producing the V-2s, which he says equates to saving perhaps 800 civilians in England. After the raid, the Germans dispersed the production to underground facilities in central Germany. The USAF made three raids in 1944, which hit the facility with much greater accuracy. I believe Middlebrook sketches out the facts but fails to draw a conclusion; namely, that had the Americans attacked Peenemünde in 1943 the damage to the facility would have been more severe. Overall, this book is not quite as good as Middlebrook's other books on RAF bomber raids.


U.S. Air Force NavigatorAbsolutely essential reading for anyone wishing to understand American bombing operations and tactics in Germany during WWII. Middlebrook's research and attention to detail are first rate! He relies on original documents and "first-hand" accounts to paint a fresh portrait of these missions from the perspective of the American bomber crew, the German fighter pilots, and the people on the ground in Schweinfurt and Regensburg. Highest recommendation. For a great perspective on British night bomber tactics, try Middlebrook's "The Berlin Raids--RAF Bomber Command Winter 1943-44." An equally excellent companion volume.


Humanitarian classic made available in English

An insightful and enduring look at the GDR's schools.

Charming, but critical

a personal experience inside the stalin's ussrLeonhard is one of the most important experts in marxism.
For 20 years after the peace the predictions of Lord Keynes that the treaty would fail were believed, and to some extent it did, but only because his very prediction resulted in the disunity amongst the Allies that rendered the treaty impotent.
Far from beggaring Germany during the inter-war period as Keynes suggested it would, Mantoux shows that the actual reparation payments were near insignificant with respect to what was spent on the rebuilding of the infrastructure that finally gave rise to the Nazi war machine, and that many of those things that we blame on the treaty are a result of the non-application of the treaty terms.
Sadly, Mantoux died a hero in the final days of the Second World War. He lived fighting the injustice done to the Versailles peace and died fighting the consiquences of this injustice.