This book is truly a wealth of knowledge on this well known area. For years I had wondered about the creatures that had been preserved in the Hunsruck slates. This curiosity was only compounded when I would see some animal named in a reference but without any graphical representation. Well, no one has to wonder anymore as this book delves into the entire fauna of the slates. In fact you MUST have this book if you wish to be a knowldgeable collector of these German fossils. This book has in-depth narratives of everything from blastoids to trilobites and a bunch of strange things in-between. Pictures, and in some instances radiographs to show the soft body tissue preservation, are also included with the descriptions to make them even more helpful. Although "technical" terminology is used it is easily understandable by beginning collectors. I give my highest recommendations for this truly insightful work.

This book is very entertaining reading with beautiful illustrations. My 2 yr old daughter loves to hear it, but I think I enjoy it even more. The book is about 4 girls who need to make it in the world. They do not want to be dependent on anyone, but know that being women will make it difficult to become successful. It explains how they learn their trades & land great jobs. In the end, they marry men who love them for who they are and the skills that they have (but marriage was not their only goal in life). In addition, the words of the princess bride can teach a lesson for the next generation.

With the recent interest in German wunderkind photographers Andreas Gursky, Thomas Ruff and Thomas Struth (known collectively as 'Struffsky') its particularly telling to see early work by their mentors Bernd and Hilla Becher. Framework Houses is among their earliest work, with the bulk of it dating from the early sixties through the seventies. The virtually patented Becher formula of typology is already in place (back at a time when Robert Adams was still a struggling English major): same flat viewing angle, precisionist approach and shadowless light. Taken individually, the photos are deadpan documents of an architectural type, but the strength of the Becher's work has always lay in the collective. The effect of seeing page after page of images so similar, yet individual, is an astonishing rendering of a past industrial age. This rendering is underlined in the last section of the book where the images are grouped in the famous Becher grids. Where this body departs from their other series of factories, water towers, et al, is that while the houses are part of an industrial region, they aren't industrial structures. Other series describe the 'what' of function, but these domestic forms also include a possible 'who' of the people that reside there. An interest in pattern is evident, too. The graphic rendering of shingle siding or dark timber against light stucco is a surprisingly lyrical play on theme and variation, where the grid of halftimbers begins to deviate from strict rationality. In the overall collective, this line quality becomes almost as giddy as a Paul Klee etching. This series is likely the least typical of the Becher's work, but in my opinion, is the most compelling.

"France and Germany at Maastricht is simply political science at its best. Its analytical narrative of Franco-German negotiations on political and monetary union is the most thorough and balanced account of the pivotal episode in the current project of European unity. It combines a comprehensive understanding of the national and sectoral interests at stake in the Maastricht negotiations with a firm grasp of the institutional and electoral environment in which negotiations proceeded. The depth and breadth of the research material required by a study of this variety alone is impressive, but Mazzucelli's lucid explanation of its meaning makes the book a valuable addition to the fields of European studies, comparative politics and international relations." -Carl C. Hodge, Okanagan University College

"In the present context of the efforts to promote a European Union and Franco-German relations, Dr. Mazzucelli's book constitutes an extraordinarily useful contribution to the statesman's, diplomat's, scholar's and layman's reflections on these matters and provides extremely useful leads to all those who, in one way or another, are responsible for the destiny of the European continent and its relations with other parts of the world, in particular its transatlantic allies." -His Excellency Alfred Cahen, Secretary General, Atlantic Treaty Association

"This very informative and balanced volume, rich in factual content and documentary materials, is recommended to politicians, diplomats, experts in European Union affairs and those who would like insight into "corridor diplomacy" during the Maastricht process. This book is also suggested to those who feel responsible for the success of Hungary's negotiations with the European institutions." -Hungarian Foreign Affairs Journal, Spring '97

"Mazzucelli provides an extremely detailed analysis of the national decision-making processes of two of the principal players in the Maastricht negotiations, and a comprehensive discussion of the national, subnational and transnational actors central to the negotiating process...The book's focus and methodological sophistication make it most useful for specialists in the field." -Choice, September '97

"The story Mazzucelli narrates is a fascinating one. The reader is taken inside negotiations in cabinets, ministerial offices and presidential palaces; in national parliaments, government conclaves, Commission meetings, and Council deliberations. We are given a detailed picture of the relationships developed at every level of the bureaucracy and between regional, national and Brussels bureaucracies. This is one of the best documented accounts I have seen of the manifold intricacies of EU politics and negotiation. Mazzucelli has an impressive command of both the primary and secondary materials in French, German, Italian and English. She is also a skilled and assiduous interviewer and has woven into her narrative information obtained over a period of several years. The book is impeccably footnoted and the 33-page bibliography is a mine of information. It is a pleasure to read a book produced with such care." -Glenda G. Rosenthal, Columbia University ECSA Review, Fall '97

"The originality of this work, over and above the attentive look at French and German behavior during this IGC, is that it analyzes the negotiation - which was so difficult for several Member States at domestic level - combining three approaches: "Jean Monnet's practical and purposeful way of doing things," Putnam's "two-level games" (this approach...seems particularly useful in the case of Maastricht, given its emphasis on both "internal bargaining at the domestic level and external negotiations at the international level") and the "four images" of civil servants described by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman...Anyone involved in another European Union IGC should be very interested in this analysis..." -"Europe" Bulletin, "European Library," Brussels, 15 & 16 December '97

"Mazzucelli's book sheds light on the history of Franco-German governmental relations as the Cold War ended..., situates Franco-German bilateralism within a process of multilateral negotiations in the European Union..., and empirically confirms that it is not possible to understand European integration without taking into account the institutional diversity of states....This volume deserves to be read with interest...,and offers leads for theoretical reflection to all those who work in the areas of integration, foreign policy and the political sociology of European states." -Christian Lequesne, CERI, Revue Française de Science Politique, décembre '97

"In light of the recent events in Brussels, this analysis of French-German relations in the framework of European integration is extremely topical....It examines whether the two European powers, which played a leading role in the period considered, will continue to play a similar role in the enlarged Europe of the future....It should be pointed out that the study is heavily based on primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with personalities from the political and academic worlds carried out in various European countries between 1992 and 1994." -The International Spectator, Rome, April-June '98

"According to Mazzucelli the process of EU intergovernmental conferences is not subsumed under the intergovernmental approach ....Neofunctional and federal approaches are also not regarded by her as useful for this analysis. In the author's view, these approaches underestimate the complexity of the integration process and do not consider sufficiently the contradictory relations between Brussels and the member states....Furthermore since intergovernmental conferences will be an important element of European integration, i.e., Amsterdam, works like this one by Mazzucelli are important for the analysis of the process of European unity." -Paul Luif, Austrian Institute of International Affairs, Austrian Journal of Political Science, Issue Number 4 '98

Life in France after the First World War just didn't make sense to a country that could have been content to win the war. To wit, a political cabinet change at the beginning of 1922 would be enough to fuel one young woman to take off all her clothes in freezing cold weather one afternoon and voice her mad opinions to a crowd assembled at the Place Pigalle. Other Frenchmen killed themselves and their loved ones, deciding that the postwar period was a bit too overwhelming with its high inflation, soaring crime rate, changing moral codes and addictions, among other things. Over 1.3 Frenchmen died in this war and the destruction was said to be 55 million francs. France stood alone trying to face Germany, as everything around it seemed to be going to hell.

If the country were a canvas, then Dadaist mayhem was splashed across it from end to end, evoking a portrait of a country that won a war and, yet lost the peace.

Benjamin F. Martin's France and the Apres Guerre 1918-1924: Illusions and Disillusionment is not so much about a country standing as tall and proud in victory as its very own Arc de Triomphe, but about one that found it could no longer embrace the creature comforts and good times it knew in the Belle Epoque. A wonderfully-written roller coaster ride through the politics and political figures of the period, the harsh postwar conditions, widespread changes and society, it uses anecdotes about how the leaders of the day -- Georges Clemenceau, Raymond Poincare, and Aristide Briand -- tried to make sense of the period in the midst of stories of everyday Frenchmen struggling to get to the next day. It is the stories of these everyday Frenchmen that make this such an engaging -- and heartbreaking -- work. For the French, all that was old was not new again or familiar. Women were hired as detectives. Feminine beauty was not about having dangerous curves. It was about vigorous exercise, because "to get fat is to look old." Basketball was the new hot sport on the block...but the French were individualistic and too short to play it. Department stores had fur sales, but few women could afford to buy them still. Martin uses F. Scott Fitzgerald's Dick Diver to explain the sense of disillusionment: "All my beautiful lovely safe world blew itself up here with a great gust of high explosive love."

Despite the fact that the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 had major repercussions for later European history, there has been very works written about in the last forty years except for Michael Howard's excellent The Franco-Prussian War (1871) and Alistair Horne's The Fall of Paris (1967). Thankfully, Sandhurst professor Stephen Badsey has written an excellent summary of the Franco-Prussian War that is not a condensation of those previous works and which constitutes a fresh look at this neglected subject. Foremost in value, is the fact that Badsey's volume looks at the war in its entirety, rather than just the first action-packed month. Overall, Badsey's Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871 is an excellent synopsis and reference source for this critical phase in the development of European military thought and weaponry.

After some brief sections detailing the background to the war, followed by equally brief sections on the opposing sides and the outbreak of war, Stephen Badsey moves into his main 24-page narrative of the war. This narrative is supported by ten maps: Europe in 1870, the main campaigns of the war, the battles on the frontier, the situation at Metz on 14-15 August 1870, the Battle of Mars-la-Tour, two maps on the Battle of Gravelotte-St Privat, the Battle of Sedan, the siege of Paris, and Europe after the war. The illustrations throughout the text are also excellent. Additionally, the concluding sections, such as Portrait of a Soldier, are also quite good. Overall, The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871 probably packs more into the Osprey Essential Histories format than any other volume to date.

Badsey notes that the French performance in 1870 was so poor that it surprised both sides. Despite possession of superior weaponry (early machine guns, better breech-loading rifles), the French army was handicapped by sloppy staff work and a primitive reserve mobilization system. In essence, the French war machine was brave and well equipped, but totally disorganized. French senior leadership, including the Emperor Napoleon III, was so terrible as to defy rationale explanation. Amazingly, the French declared war on Prussia then had no plans or preparations for an offensive war. Furthermore, the French were diplomatically isolated and had to face an undistracted and increasingly unified German nation-in-being. Badsey notes that, "within a week of the fighting starting, two French armies ...were in full retreat." While the French army performed well at the tactical level - and came close to winning the major Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat - it was clearly out-performed on the operational level and the two French armies always found themselves outmaneuvered by the Prussians. After a month of war, both French field armies and the Emperor were surrounded and combat ineffective.

Badsey's approach to this subject differs from the conventional interpretation, which tends to see the war as decided in the first four weeks. In particular, Badsey notes how naval power shaped the rest of the conflict, "but critically for this stage of the war, Prussia had no effective navy. French maritime trade and commerce were largely unaffected by the end of the Second Empire and so was French credit overseas; the French economy did not collapse, and the war continued to be financed, in part by borrowing on foreign money markets. French troops were brought back from garrisons overseas and weapons shipped in from other countries." While the newly raised and poorly trained armies of the Third Republic achieved few successes on the battlefield, Badsey notes that they did succeed in protracting the war far beyond what the Prussians had expected. Furthermore, the specter of revolution that appeared in Paris during the Communard scared the Prussians sufficiently to actually assist in rebuilding the French army in order to suppress that political cancer, lest it spread to other European countries. Thus, in Badsey's approach, the reader is presented with a more comprehensive look at the conflict than just a discussion of the frontier battles.

The Franco-Prussian War was also important for several changes in the western manner of warfare. The first Geneva Convention agreements had been signed just prior to the war by both Prussia and France, and the conflict was the first where prisoners and enemy wounded were treated much better than had been heretofore the case. Although war correspondents had appeared in the Crimean War and the American Civil War, their role increased in this war and the telegraph allowed them to report on the fighting in near real-time. While Badsey claims that the Prussian "terror" bombardment of Paris was an innovation in that it targeted civilians to achieve the city's surrender, in fairness, the French should get credit for that "innovation" when Louis XIV's army used mortars to devastate the German city of Koblenz in 1688.

However, Badsey's conclusion is a bit less sure, when he asserts that the result of the war was "the replacement of France by Germany as the dominant power in Europe." France before the war, which lacked any allies, was certainly not the "dominant power in Europe" that Badsey suggests, nor did Prussia's victory and German unification reduce Russian, British or Austrian influence in Europe. While there is no doubt that the war enhanced Germany's military reputation, it did not alter the essentially multipolar balance of power that had been prevalent in Europe before the war. Indeed, in the long run, the victory may have hurt Germany because France realized the need for alliances and assiduously went about coalition building for a future war. Germany on the other hand, which fought and won the war without allies, spent much less effort on cooperative diplomacy and paid for that mistake in 1914-1918.

Wiggershouse provides, with depth and precision, a chronological account of the history of Institute of Social Research -"The Frankfurt School" - from its founding in 1924 to Adorno's death in 1969 (an Afterword briefly describes that happened to critical theory in Germany then after up to the mid 1980's). Appropriately, the book's emphasis is on the ideas of the Frankfurt School's theoreticians; the inclusion of factual episodes and brief biographies serve mainly to guide the reader through the convergences and divergences between the ideas moving around critical theory. Among the many virtues of the book, the attention given to lesser known theoreticians associated with the Institute, such as Friedrich Pollock, Franz Neumann, and Otto Kirchheimer, stand out. Another virtue is that there no attempt to elect "heroes" within this fascinating group of thinkers. Quite the contrary. Max Horkheimer, though depicted as a creative thinker, also emerges from Wiggershaus' book with dubious character. His claims in favor of an interdisciplinary research program contrast with his attitudes as the Institute's director that ended up expelling some of its most promising collaborators. The episode involving Habermas' exit from the Institute is exemplar of Horkheimer's rather intolerant personality. Theodor Adorno, described with all his intellectual brilliance, appears has the genius who voluntarily chose to stay under Horkheimer's shadow and who, at the heat of the student's movement in the 60's, took an "ivory tower" type of attitude. The book has only one noticeable flaw (if one can regard it as such). Though the emphasis on the ideas is what makes the book extremely interesting, Wiggershaus is not always successful in clarifying them. For instance, for readers not familiar with Adorno's aesthetics theory, Wiggershaus' presentation is not very useful as an introduction to this complex theory. Nevertheless, all in all, Wiggershaus' book is definitely "the" reference book for critical theory students.

This is the best biography in print of the enigmatic king of Prussia, Frederick II (The Great), who transformed his nation from a second-rate military power into a formidable nation at the expense of the Hapsburg monarchy of Maria Theresa. Duffy, the world's foremost authority on the Seven Years' War, brings his years of research into full blossom in this study of Prussia's brilliant soldier-king. Using his knowledge of military science, Duffy shows how Frederick was consistantly able to score victories over his opponents through superiior drill and tactics even though constantly outnumbered strategically. Through his adroit maneuvers, Frederick was able to increase the size of his territory significantly, yet without bankrupting his country. Duffy also elaborates on Frederick's often tempestuous relationships with his generals as well as his attitudes toward the common soldier. Frederick's many contributions toward the art of war are also showcased. This book is highly recommended for those who want a greater understanding of the rise of Prussia as a nation. -James J. Mitchel

THIS BOOK WAS OF PARTICLAR INTEREST TO ME AS ONE OF THE DESCENDANTS OF THE FRIENDLY FAMILY. THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION WAS THOROUGH AND I WAS DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPRECIATE THE RESEARCH WHICH EVENTUATED IN THIS PUBLICATION. IT WAS A SPECIAL FEELING WHICH LINKED ME WITH FAMILY MEMBERS, WHO AS A RESULT OF HISTORY, ARE NOW LIVING IN ALL AREAS OF THE WORLD.

Who was Fritz Haber? Why write, read, or review a book about him?

Fritz Haber was one of the most important, and now almost unknown, scientists of the early 20th Century - and one of the most ambivalent of all German Jews. Haber discovered a process for fixing atmospheric nitrogen, thus making possible the development of artificial fertilizers - and freeing Germany from dependence on imported nitrate for the production of gunpowder. He was the true father of the Green Revolution, "the man who brought bread from the air" - and the man who almost won the first World War single-handedly for Germany, for without gunpowder production from nitrogren fixation, Germany, cut off from nitrate imports, could not have stayed in the first World War, or begun the second - only to be dismissed by the Nazis and die in exile in Switzerland. But this is not why Haber's name is not spoken. It was Fritz Haber,patriotic German Jew, who created poison gas. And that is why Haber has been not so much overlooked, as deliberately ignored.

Stoltzenberg's book therefore fills a substantial gap. This review is written from the German text, which is clear and straightforward with few rhetorical flourishes, although highly technical in places. Those looking for pop psychoanalysis or gruesome battlefield scenes will be disappointed, as the tone is restrained and understated throughout. Stoltzenberg has unusual advantages in handling this difficult subject. He is a professional chemist himself, the son of a chemist who was a close associate of Haber during and after WWI, had access to material collected for a biography in the 1950s but unwritten at that time, and supplemented that with years of research in government and private archives. This massive book is meticulously documented, almost entirely from contemporary sources, most never published, and will surely be the standard biography.

Apologists for Haber's close friend, Albert Einstein, have excused his work on the atomic bomb on the grounds that he was really an abstract scientist, who didn't understand what he was doing, and that anyway he was a pacifist who acted only because of the Holocaust. Stoltzenberg makes it clear that these excuses don't apply to Haber. Haber was an intensely patriotic German. He deliberately invented poison gas (or rather a whole family of gases). He persuaded the government into its use, over the initial opposition of the army; was present at the first gas attack at Ypres (and always felt afterwards that if the army had believed him, and had been ready to follow up with a full-scale attack through the broken French and British lines, the war could have been won at that point - and at least a few historians have agreed with him). He organized the entire system of gas research, production, and supply, including the development and production of gas masks, and was present at numerous other attacks on both the western and eastern fronts. Stoltzenberg describes him as "besessen" -obsessed. He continued gas research secretly after the war, passing off the post-war development of Zyklon under the noses of the Allied Control Commission as a pesticide. And he never apologized or felt that he had acted wrongly.

However, the book is not limited to Haber's wartime activities. Stoltzenberg also discusses in equal detail the rest of Haber's life. These subjects include: his pre-war years in Karlsruhe, according to the author, the happiest and most successful of his life, and the development of the nitrogen fixation process, including the complicated negotiations between the university, industry, and government; the equally complicated negotiations over Haber's move to Berlin, and the creation of an entirely new division of the Kaiser Wilhelm (now Max Planck)Institute, lavishly financed and built to Haber's specifications; the years spent rebuilding the Institute after the war; the controversial award of the Nobel Prize; his failed search for gold in sea water; and his personal life. As might be expected of a man who was effectively married to his work, Haber's two marriages were both failures; his first wife shot herself and his second ended in divorce. His closest relationships were with his colleagues, and here he shone, being regarded with tremendous respect and affection. Haber was never a solitary genius, but a hands-on and hugely effective team leader, who could organize and inspire outstanding work in the most difficult circumstances.

The dismissal of Jews by the Nazis was a particularly devastating blow to Haber, a man utterly indifferent to religion, but who had always felt himself as, and been regarded by the German government as, an intense patriot. However, the story that Hitler personally called Haber into his office and fired him was apparently a journalistic fantasy; according to Stoltzenberg, it was Max Planck who demanded a personal interview with Hitler in order to plead for his Jewish colleagues, and who personally endured Hitler's irrational ranting. The experience was not repeated. Haber left for England, but was not especially happy. He died in Switzerland, and was buried there. Stoltzenberg accepts the official view that Haber, having been ill for years, not least due to his own constant exposure to poisonous gases, died, in the presence of his son and his own doctor, of a heart attack - or, of a broken heart.

This is not a book for the casual reader, and Jews especially may find it emotionally painful. However, those readers with a serious interest in Haber, the history and sociology of science, the military history of WWI, German Jews, or the Holocaust will find it well worth their effort and expense.